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A bstract
The paper presents a comparative review of the privatization processes 
under way in Central and Eastern European countries. In line with the 
findings of recent economic literature, it is argued that also in economies in 
transition the privatization process depends crucially on the prevailing 
institutional arrangements. In particular, the increase in economic efficiency 
generally attributed to privatization very much hinges on the 
competitiveness and the degree of regulation that characterizes the economic 
system. In the case of formerly planned economies, privatization must be 
paralleled by the creation of an appropriate system of corporate governance. 
The paper reviews various privatization methods and their application to 
Central and Eastern European countries. Targets, constraints and 
implications are identified for the strategies followed by various post* 
communist countries. The paper concludes that despite the indisputable need 
to expand the activity of the private sector substantially, approaches to 
privatization more tailored to the institutional reality of the countries in 
transition would have implied lower costs for the state budget and, arguably, 
for the economy as a whole.
JEL Classification no. L10, L33, P31, P52.
1 I am grateful to Alberto Chilosi, Enrico Colombatto and Milica Uvalic, as well 
as an anonymous referee, for comments on a preliminary version of this paper. 
Remaining errors arc my own.

31 . Introduction
The debate on privatization has been going on for more than a decade. It 
started at the beginning o f the eighties with the privatization plans of the 
Conservative governments in Britain and re-privatizations of the centre- 
right government in France. It then turned into a more general analysis of 
the role of the state in the economy in many developed and less developed 
countries.
In a wider interpretation, which concerns the definition of property 
rights and the transition from an economy dominated by collective 
ownership to one where private property prevails, it is also one of the main 
issues of the transition to a market economy now under way in the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) and in the former Soviet republics.
In all these countries, which are the focus of this paper, the process of 
privatization has not only been perceived as an essential component of the 
creation of the market system, but, according to a prevailing view, the 
simple elimination of central planning and the introduction o f private 
ownership would have automatically and rapidly generated the market 
system itself and led to rapid growth of income and wealth in CEECs.2
The transfer of ownership rights from the state to individual citizens in 
post-communist societies has received strong political priority and the 
unconditional support of the new leadership. The introduction of 
privatization has been an enormous break with the past and an essential 
component of the 'regime change'. However, the advantages of a rapid and 
thorough ownership transfer have been overestimated. Privatization has 
been seen as having only positive effects, a sort of panacea capable of 
immediately solving all the problems created by the transition to a market
2 For a thorough discussion of this aspect of the debate on transition, see Kregel, 
1992.
4economy. In a view shared by many East European policy-makers and by 
their Western advisors, the transfer of property rights should have taken 
place, mostly by transferring economic activities to the private sector, 
within a few months after the beginning of the adjustment process; all viable 
enterprise should have been privatized as quickly as possible, and all non- 
viable enterprises closed.
Very rapid privatization was deemed necessary in order to prevent 
expropriation of the existing assets by the nomenklatura and managers, to 
break the political control over the enterprises and to obtain consensus for 
the reforms. With the benefit of hindsight, all this emphasis on speed cannot 
be entirely justified. The market mechanism that is supposed to be 
established in the transition is by definition a system of evolutionary, 
marginal changes, and cannot handle global transformations (Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1994). It should be more correctly seen as a social institution, 
a complex network of signalling devices, regulations, interpersonal relations 
and expectations, which, in Western countries, has developed over centuries 
of capitalism and cannot be replicated overnight. Even assuming that in the 
distorted world of centrally planned economies on the eve of the transition, 
it would have been possible to draw a distinction between unviable 
enterprises and enterprises in temporary difficulty; many of the benefits that 
are generally associated with privatization in transitional economies 
(increase in efficiency, consolidation of democracy, raising revenue for the 
state budget, etc.) do not seem to derive any particular advantage from the 
rapid implementation of privatization plans. Quite the contrary, the lack of 
some key institutions has constrained the process dramatically. In reality, 
privatization (particularly of large state-owned enterprises) has proceeded 
much more slowly than envisaged and, in some countries, private activity 
has grown more as a result of the birth of new firms rather than of the 
privatization of existing state assets.
5The experience of developed market economies (and to a lesser extent of 
some developing countries) has often been recalled as a useful model for 
economies in transition. There are indeed lessons to be learned; however, 
there are also enormous differences that should be kept in mind. First, there 
is a difference in aims. Western privatizations have mostly been devoted to 
reducing the presence of the public sector, as producer, in the economy. The 
main objective of privatization for post-communist economies has been the 
creation of a market environment, moving away from the previous hyper- 
centralized command system. It follows that the scale of the exercise is 
completely different. As indicated by Fisher (1991, p. 4), the largest 
privatization programme in a market environment, post-Allende Chile, 
concerned firms producing about 25% of GNP. The share of the public 
sector in value added in Western European countries on the eve of the 
privatization programmes ranged from 16.5% (France) to 10.7% (the UK 
and FRG). Vice versa, the share of the state sector in value added in the 
mid-1980s varied in socialist countries from 65.2% in China to over 96% in 
the USSR, Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Moreover, while, in principle, 
privatization in Western countries does not require an ad hoc legal 
framework, economies in transition face the necessity to adopt an extensive 
body of legislation and to create a number of institutions which simply were 
not necessary in a command system. Western market economies are 
characterized by the existence of markets for corporate control, financial 
markets and stock exchanges. Those institutions, which have evolved over 
decades, take a variety o f forms in different countries and perform a large 
number of functions, especially with respect to the transfer of ownership 
and control of the performance of managers and firms.3 It is by now 
painfully clear that shortcuts do not work. Even in Central and Eastern
3 One could consider, for instance, the functions performed by the stock market: 
risk sharing, guiding investment, measurement of the value of assets, increase in the 
value of assets (Tirole, 1992, 227*228).
6Europe the need exists to create an appropriate structure of corporate 
organization, a complex set of rules and institutions (including corporate 
law and appropriate banking and financial systems) which all combine to 
define the nature of a market economy. This process will probably take a 
long time; a period certainly longer than was envisaged at the outset of the 
transition.
The above considerations should not be interpreted as implying that 
before starting their privatization drive. Central and East European 
countries should have waited for the completion of a proper institutional 
framework. However, strategies could have been tailored more to reflect the 
institutional settings of the countries involved. In particular, the debate 
seems to have centred mostly on the speed of the privatization process, 
leaving aside other important aspects, such as to what extent should the state 
divestiture have been pushed or how to deal with the state sector during the 
transition, or how to ensure its coexistence alongside the private sector 
during the transition.
The remaining part of the paper will discuss some of these issues further 
and will review the privatization experiences o f Central and Eastern 
European countries to date. The theoretical rationale for privatization in 
economies in transition is identified in the next section, starting with a 
discussion of the concepts of property rights and privatization. Various 
privatization methods are then reviewed in section 3 and their application to 
Central and Eastern European countries addressed in section 4. Targets, 
constraints and implications are identified for the strategies followed by 
various post-communist countries in section 5, where a preliminary 
assessment is attempted. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.
72. Theoretical Underpinning of Privatization
2,1. Property rights and privatization
Property rights theory (see Furubotn and Pejovich, 1974) contends that the 
market, as a coordinating device of decentralized decisions, must be based 
on an extensive system of property rights. In an economy where collective 
ownership prevails, the state cannot control in a proper way managerial 
behaviour. This is prevented by distance (in an informational sense), lack of 
coordination and incentives. In a society with diffused technology, for the 
decentralized coordination of productive specialization to work according to 
comparative advantages, people must have secure, alienable property rights 
to negotiate at low cost reliable contractual transactions as regards 
productive resources and products tradable at mutually agreeable prices.4
At the beginning of the transition in all formerly planned economy 
(economies/?) not only were property rights ill-defined, but also a 
normative and institutional framework was lacking, which in a market 
economy is capable of securing alienable property rights.^ The different 
nature and extension of the pre-transition reform of the state enterprise 
sector left the CEECs with different forms o f state enterprises and
4 According to a standard definition, the right of ownership in an asset consists of 
three elements: (a) the right to use the asset (uras), (b) the right to appropriate returns 
from the asset («jus fructus), (c) the right to change the asset's form and/or 
substance {abuses) (Furubotn and Pejovich 1974, p. 4). Its force is measured by 
probability and costs of enforcement which depend on the government, informal 
social actions and prevailing ethical and moral norms (Alchian, 1987, p. 1031). The 
rights to use (and to dispose oQ goods, services or things with regard to production 
and exchange arc designated as control rights. Such control rights may arise either as 
a result of ownership, or they may be delegated to the holder by others, or they may 
adhere to an office that the holder occupies.
5 However, even in a socialist society where supposedly private property of the 
means of production does not exists or is very limited, individuals in particular 
positions may exert a power similar to those of capitalist owners {nomenklatura). 
The recent experience of Central and Eastern Europe suggests in this respect a sort of 
continuum in the two systems. The so-called 'wild-privatization* phenomenon that 
has characterized the first phase of the privatization drive in all former communist 
countries, has not been reversed in the course of the process and the best assets of 
some enterprises have been appropriated by a very limited number of managers and 
workers of the same enterprise.
8managerial control. Although the state was nominally the owner of the 
enterprise, in reality managers and workers were able de jure in some 
countries, de facto in others, to claim effective ownership rights.6
With respect to the experience of post-communist economies, the usual 
definition of the term 'privatization', i.e. the transfer of economic activity to 
the private sector (Jenkinson, 1992), is too restrictive.7 According to 
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994, p. 200), in Central and Eastern Europe, 
'privatization to a large extent is not so much a process by which assets in 
the state sector become revitalised, but rather a more or less managed 
process of decline and retirement of an ex-ante unknown, but largely 
substantial portion of these assets'.
But why (and to what extent) should the state ’wither away' in post­
communist countries? For a market economy, the theoretical roots of 
privatization are often identified in the relationship between ownership and 
performance of an enterprise. The economic literature has repeatedly 
attempted to verify if and to what extent different forms of ownership can 
exert an influence on performance and behaviour of the firm. Conclusions 
are not unique. Some authors (see, for instance, Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1974, pp. 6-8) claim that a change in ownership may lead to a different 
incentives structure for economic agents and induce a change in the 
behaviour of managers and enterprise performance. It is generally 
maintained that public enterprises have a lower efficiency because enterprise 
objectives deviate from maximization of profits and because monitoring 
arrangements are inadequate due to the absence of capital market discipline. 
However, this argument has not gone unchallenged. In fact, part of the
6 For an analysis of the pre-transition enterprise system and of the extent to which 
this has constrained the choice of methods, attitudes and results of privatization, see 
Frydman et al., 1993.
7 As other definitions commonly accepted and based on transfer of control 
(Hemming and Mansoor, 1988), or the transfer of the right to receive the enterprise 
profit (Yarrow, 1986).
9economic literature considers that a correct definition of property rights is a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for increasing social welfare. For 
instance, Estrin (1994, p. 14) reminds us that the so-called first fundamental 
theorem of welfare8 is indifferent to ownership rights: any given 
distribution of endowments or ownership rights can be supported by a 
competitive equilibrium.9
The economic literature on transition (see, for instance, Grosfeld 1990, 
Dhanji and Milanovic 1992, Tirale 1992) identifies the positive impact of 
the transfer of ownership rights on the performance of economic agents as 
one of the main reasons to proceed to large-scale privatizations. In this case 
too privatization is meant to induce advantages in terms of static (productive 
and allocative) and dynamic efficiency (Grosfeld, 1990). Productive 
efficiency will improve since private principals have stronger incentives to 
deal effectively with moral hazard than public principals, although none of 
them can avoid the problem of asymmetric information. Increases in 
allocative efficiency go back to the old Von Mises* argument that in order to 
have resources allocated efficiently, we need prices representing efficient 
valuation of relative rates of return, which can be determined only on 
capital markets. However, at least in theory, this kind of increase could also 
be obtained if the state owns the means of production.10
8 The competitive equilibrium attained by the free market generates economic 
efficiency in the Paretian sense.
9 Public ownership indeed makes the owner-manager relationship more 
complicated because the chain of principals and agents is expanded, objecuves are 
politically determined and conveyed by an administrative structure to management 
(see Estrin and Pcrotin, 1991). But the relative efficiency of public against private 
ownership seems to depend more on other factors: the efficiency of capital market 
monitoring, the political and constitutional system, the information and sanctions 
available to policy-makers and the nature of the market for managerial skills. Estrin 
(1994) also recalls that theoretical models of decentralized planning or workers' self­
management isolated equilibria identical to those attained under competitive 
capitalism.
10 Nuti (1989) elaborates a model in which the public enterprises, transformed into 
joint-stock companies, are permitted to detain reciprocally shares, while profit- 
maximizing specialized state institutions (holdings, banks, etc.) supervise 
management performance with results similar to those obtained in the capital market
10
Furthermore, the increase in dynamic efficiency seems more due to the 
existence of particular institutions than to a specific form of property. 
Certainly a private market economy offers a continuous evaluation of the 
firm's assets by the capital market and favours the selection of organizations 
which have the best combination of trial-generation and error-elimination 
capacities (Grosfeld, 1990), thus stimulating the introduction of 
technological progress and new productive processes. However, if it is true 
that the anti-innovation bias is a feature of the Soviet-type economy, in 
theory the functioning of capitalist-like institutions could also be simulated 
in a different institutional context.
The extensive work on privatization in Western Europe (above all, 
Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, on Great Britain) indicates that privatization 
must be accompanied by adequate measures to reduce and contain market 
pow er.11 The increase in efficiency deriving from the change of the 
incentives depends crucially on the level of competition and the degree of 
regulation of the environment in which the enterprise operates. The degree 
of competition and the efficiency of the regulatory system seem to have a 
greater impact on enterprise performance than ownership in itself.
In the case of transitional economies, this aspect has been overlooked, 
especially by those economists in prominent positions for influencing policy­
makers. For instance, Jeffrey Sachs, famous economic counsellor of many 
Eastern European governments, recommends maximum priority being 
given to privatization, regardless of the state of infrastructures, market 
conditions, lack of institutions capable of effectively managing the 
privatization process itself (Lipton and Sachs 1990, Sachs 1992). Important 
market failures characterized post-communist economies at the beginning of 
the transition (and to a large extent still do). The structure inherited from
11 Competition can be increased by removing barriers to entry, restructuring the 
dominant enterprise, discouraging strategic behaviour o f the enterprise towards the 
regulatory authority. Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, pp. 426-27.
the past regime presented features of great concentration, with very few 
enterprises of enormous dimensions in the main productive sectors. Under 
those circumstances, as argued by Bös (1993, pp. 103-104), if the privatized 
firm is a monopoly, privatization would not induce all the positive results 
recalled above. Privatization will indeed change the nature of the principal- 
agent relationship and the objectives (from party-political planning to profit 
maximization). However, it may lead to allocative inefficient high prices 
which have to be traded off against the productivity increases resulting from 
privatization (Bös, 1993, p. 104). 12 This would suggest that some degree of 
restructuring should take place before privatization.
The issue of restructuring before or after privatization has been present 
in the debate on transition. The need to proceed to some degree of 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises before privatizing them has been 
justified mostly with the necessity to modify the industrial structure 
inherited by the communist regime, as centrally planned economies were 
characterised by enterprises of very large dimensions, with a strong bias in 
favour of heavy industry, a very small service sector and an abnormally 
large proportion of output geared to the CMBA market. However, it is 
generally recognized that a thorough restructuring of the state sector would 
entail enormous costs for the state budget and would delay further the 
privatization process. Furthermore, as suggested by Estrin (1994), in an 
environment of tight state credit, privatization holds out the pressure for 
access to relatively cheap new funds and private owners are probably more 
willing and able to withstand pressure for wage increases.
I I
*2 if the privatized finn operates in a competitive environment, profit maximization 
corresponds to welfare maximization, hence a change from party objectives to profit 
maximization is a move for the better. BOs, 1993, p.104.
12
2.2. Ownership and control
Very often in developed market economies, management functions are 
detached from property, or in any case by the right to receive residual 
income from the activity of the enterprise.13 The issue of the separation 
between ownership and control is o f the utmost importance also for 
economies in transition, where there is a clear need to establish 
arrangements giving owners and creditors some control over enterprises. 
The absence of effective governance might have serious consequences, since 
the managers could work in the interests of major stakeholder (the labour 
force or the management itself) and avoid any kind of restructuring.
The outcome of privatization process in the CEECs indicates that in 
addition to the need to make the regime change irreversible by transferring 
all (or a very large part of) state assets into private hands, there is the 
specific necessity (and willingness) to benefit insiders from the process of 
privatization.14 Only a limited constituency of people, the argument goes, 
will benefit from the transition process. There is therefore the need to 
motivate groups (workers &/or managers of state-owned enterprises) in 
support of the process of transformation through privatization. In the 
absence of this particular incentive, once privatization is proclaimed a main 
political objective, the public sector loses a long-term perspective and 
residual legitimation. Managers have an incentive to play end games, that is, 
enrich themselves at the expenses of the enterprise assets before a new 
private owner takes control.15
13 The relationship between manager and owner is commonly represented in terms 
of an agency problem.
14 The importance of this factor is increasingly recognized in the literature; see for 
instance, Estrin, 1994, Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994. A stimulating paper by 
Bogetic (1993) shows how minority employee ownership combined with a free 
market for shares could be advantageous in the process of privatization by lowering 
political resistance to privatization.
15 On this point see also Chilosi, 1993a.
13
The discipline of capital market is often indicated as a way to devise 
arrangements empowering and motivating outsiders to engage in enterprise 
control. Two main alternatives are often mentioned: takeovers or other 
aggressive corporate control mechanisms, and the creation of a group of 
core investors. The first is very unlikely to work in an environment 
characterized by an underdeveloped capital market. The second is probably 
more viable, but not immediately applicable for CEECs, where stock 
markets are thin, highly illiquid and volatile and cannot yet play a role as a 
mechanism for corporate control and allocation of financial resources.16
It is common believe that in economies in transition a supervisory role 
could usefully be performed by financial institutions. Two alternative 
models have been considered: a market-based model and a universal banking 
system. A recent study by Steinherr (1992) suggests some complementarities 
among the two models, more than their mutually exclusive character. The 
hypothesis is based on the observation that the relative importance of 
different segments of the financial system changes with the level of 
development At an early stage of industrialization, the financial system is 
mainly bank-oriented: per capita, income is low, savings are collected and 
allocated by banks, while enterprises tend to retain and reinvest their 
savings. As income increases, capital markets begin to play a larger role and 
other savings-collecting institutions start to appear. At a more advanced 
stage, when the relative share of manufacturing on total output declines and 
the share of the service sector increases, there is room for a greater role for 
the capital market. Investors are more willing to invest in financial assets 
with a higher risk and smaller degree of liquidity.
At the early stage in their transformation, most CEECs seem to have 
moved towards the universal banking model. The satisfactory performance
16 Moreover, markets are prone to speculative bubbles and collapses, and, as the 
recent experiences of MMM in Russia and Cantos in Romania suggest, vulnerable to 
fraud.
14
of a model based on debt-monitoring, however, means that it would need to 
solve several problems which are currently affecting economies in 
transition. In the first place, the capability o f creditors to influence 
enterprise behaviour depends in all economic systems on legal provisions 
for bankruptcy. So far in economies in transition bankruptcy legislation has 
been applied to different extents in different countries: in a more rigorous 
way in the Czech Republic or in Hungary, in a rather loose way in the 
Russian Federation. Moreover, under the present conditions, there are 
doubts that banks are at all equipped to play this kind of role. The banking 
system in Central and Eastern Europe is still largely dominated by under­
capitalized, state-owned banks, loaded with bad debts and inter-enterprise 
arrears. In order to initiate and supervise a programme of restructuring of 
state-owned enterprises, bad debts should be eliminated and existing banks 
should be recapitalized. Several proposals have been advanced for cleaning 
the bad debt off the banks’ balance sheets. The so-called centralized strategy 
relies essentially on the transfer of the bad debt to a central body, which 
generally is a government-sponsored institution created specifically for this 
purpose. The institution has the responsibility for debt-restructuring and the 
eventual liquidation o f the state-owned enterprise. A simultaneous 
recapitalization of the bank is envisaged to make up for the loss of assets. In 
the so-called decentralized approach, the banks themselves manage the debt- 
restructuring, by separating the bad loans from the other loans. This can be 
done by establishing a separate department with a special management team 
within the bank, or by creating a spin-off subsidiary to which the bad debts 
could be transferred. To my knowledge, Poland is the only post-communist 
country that has so far relied more on the decentralized approach.17
17 An extensive review of the problems linked lo the transformation of the banking 
system can be found in Blommcstcin and Lange, 1993.
15
2.3. Privatization and the state budget
In a market economy, privatization of toss-making or heavily subsidized 
state-owned enterprises is commonly perceived as having a positive impact 
on fiscal stance. The case is often mention that termination of subsidies or 
the disposal of loss-making activities managed directly by the state will 
induce savings in the state budget.
However, it can be shown that under a specific set of realistic 
assumptions, this intuitive statement is wrong. Assuming that the state 
receives for the enterprise a sum that is equal to the present value of the 
foregone net income, it can be demonstrated (see Mansoor, 1988) that fiscal 
stance is in most cases permanently unaffected by privatization. Indeed, 
unless enterprise performance increases as a result of privadzation, i.e., if 
the firm is run more efficiently in the private sector, privatizadon may 
worsen the medium-term budgetary outcome.
The economic literature maintains that changes in the convendonal 
deficit are not an appropriate indicator of the net effect of privatizadon (see 
for instance Buckland and Davis, 1984; Mayer and Meadowcroft, 1986; 
Mansoor, 1988). The sale of public assets reduces, at least in the short term, 
the public sector borrowing requirement, but changes in the overall deficit 
do not take into account the effects of sales on the net worth of the 
government. At the same time, privatizadon has an impact on the 
intertemporal distribution of the public deficit, easing the liquidity 
constraint in the short term, thus providing a margin for cutting taxes or 
increasing expenditure. This policy, however, might need to be reversed in 
future years.
At macroeconomic level, a further negative feature can be identified. 
While privatization revenue accrues almost immediately to the budget, 
foregone income needs to be discounted. The political preference being 
given to privatization may lead to excessive discount rates being applied to
16
future net income streams, thus underestimating its contribution in the long 
run. Privatization could, on the contrary, reinforce the government 
credibility, if it is interpreted as a component of a restrictive fiscal policy. 
In this respect, it could also induce positive effects on public debt, 
particularly by contributing to reduce inflationary expectations (see Chiri, 
1989, p.l 14).
Most of the issues raised above are of a general nature and apply also to 
economies in transition. In addition, let me mention a few more specific 
factors that need to be taken into account in the case of post-communist 
economies. Consensus seems to have emerged in the recent debate on the 
fact that receipts from privatization are not an appropriate source of budget­
financing for economies in transition. As indicated by Bolton and Roland 
(1992, p. 288) the main obstacle towards the implementation of a policy 
based on sales of state assets is what the authors call the 'stock-flow 
constraint': in a closed economy, without pre-existing private wealth or 
capital markets, the most the government can get from selling a stock of 
assets is a flow of savings.18 In addition, the in ter-temporal consequences of 
privatization on public finances are affected by the institutional changes 
taking place during the transition. In particular, the taxation system is 
undergoing a deep transformation in all post-communist countries. The 
outcome of privatization on the state budget will depend strongly inter alia 
on the capacity to levy and the efficiency of the new system of taxation, that 
in turn would require some degree of current and perspective 
macroeconomic stability. A further specific obstacle for economies in 
transition is the difficulty to proceed to a correct evaluation of assets and 
consequently to devise 'correct' prices at which assets should be offered,
■V '
18 Bolton and Roland propose to alleviate the stock-flow constraint by allowing the 
government to sell state assets in exchange for claims on future cash-flows generated 
by the assets. This point is discussed further in section 3.
L17
given the existence of an environment characterized by the lack of proper 
accountancy criteria and by a distorted structure of relative prices.
2.4. Alternatives to privatization
Before turning to an overview of the privatization process in Central and 
Eastern Europe, let me point out very briefly two alternatives to 
privatization of existing state assets which emerged at an early stage of the 
debate, but, however, did not receive much attention from policy-makers in 
Central and East European countries.
The recognition that the state sector presents some built-in tendencies 
against restructuring has led some authors (among others, Kornai, 1991) to 
put more emphasis on the expansion of the new private sector. The main 
problem which the proposal is trying to address concerns the way in which 
the state sector can be controlled and run until its demise. According to this 
view, which is sometimes termed 'evolutionist', the state sector should have 
been allowed to die a natural death and no front-loaded privatization should 
have been attempted. The main rationale is to avoid the huge social costs that 
a thorough and rapid dismissal of the state sector would have caused in 
many post-communist economies. In this approach, the private sector is 
emerging almost exclusively out of the spontaneous development of private 
activities. As its growth progresses, it should be able to absorb labour force 
previously employed by the state sector, attracting, in a sort of 'natural 
selection', its most skilled and entrepreneurial components first. The main 
problem the proposal is facing is the envisaged coexistence of a large (and 
powerful) public sector with a small private one for an indefinite, but 
probably fairly long period of time. The state, by imposing restrictive 
policy measures over state-owned enterprises, should guarantee to the 
developing private sector a fair treatment and at least equal access to
18
resources as the public sector. And it is the excessive reliance on a strict 
regulatory power of the state during the transition that has been seen as the 
main shortcoming of this approach. 19
In another proposal, Chilosi (1993a and 1993b) describes pros and cons 
of alternatives schemes based on privatization of management and control 
without a corresponding privatization of ownership. The main scheme 
(Chilosi 1993b, pp. 13-14) delineates a non-discretionary privatization 
process based on depriving state-held shares of voting rights. State 
enterprises are first transformed into joint-stock companies, while a 
constitutional law deprives the shares which remain in state hands of voting 
rights. Then a certain percentage of the capital o f the firm is sold through 
auctions to the highest bidder. The remaining state quotas are subsequently 
auctioned until the state share is reduced to the required proportion. 
Incentives for an efficient management of the enterprises can be devised, for 
instance, by means o f option rights to existing private shareholders 
depending on the profitability of the company, or entitlement to appropriate 
residual income. In the intention of its proponents, the application of a 
similar scheme would have conjugated an instantaneous privatization of 
management with a more gradual privatization of ownership. Arguably, 
conferring the entire decision-making power to the minority of shares 
(those in private hands) could encourage risky ventures. However, a delayed 
move towards a massive privatization could have implied a reduction in the 
costs deriving from the complete neglect of the state sector, while 
advantages could have been derived for the state budget through a more 
gradual offer of assets on the market. 19
19 The ’evolulionisis' view' is criticized, among others, by Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1994, pp. 200-204.
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3 .  Methods o f Privatization
Different privatization methods have been used both in developed and 
developing countries. Some of them are summarized in Table 1, where an 
attempt is made to identify options and possible distinctive features of each 
scheme.
The two most common procedures followed for sale privatization are: 
offer for sale or tender offer. Either shares or assets can be offered on sale. 
An offer for sale takes place at a fixed price and requires an accurate 
estimate of the value of the enterprise. As indicated in the Table, a number 
o f options are possible as regards participation (allowing foreigners to 
participate or not), and restrictions on size of individuals or foreign 
shareholding. A preliminary decision has to be taken with regard to 
restructuring of the enterprise, both in terms of operational restructuring 
and market power. Public offerings present advantages in terms of 
substantial revenues for the budget, non-discretionality and widespread 
shareholding. Their use, however, is limited by a strong dependence on 
primary markets, availability of capital and investors.20 Private sales 
introduce discretionality and lack of transparency into the process, but are 
generally considered a feasible alternative in underdeveloped equity 
markets.
In a tender offer, bids are normally invited at or above a stated 
minimum price. It has the advantage of not requiring a precise estimate of 
the value of the firm, although it is often a complex procedure which might 
discourage the participation of small investors.
Some authors regard auctions as an optimal solution to the problems 
posed by privatization. Bolton and Roland (1992) suggest that participation
20 A further disadvantage may be represented by possible crowding-out effects.
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in auctions should also be allowed for individuals with limited wealth but 
potential managerial capacity. By way of non-cash bids, individuals could be 
allowed to borrow against future earnings creating a wider participation and 
potentially contributing to increase the productive efficiency of the entire 
process.21 The scheme also has the advantage of eliminating the stock-flow 
constraint described above, whereby the state, by selling the stock of assets, 
can only receive a flow of savings.
Management/employee buy-outs have been used extensively both in 
developed and developing countries. The methods, which present at least 
four variants (see Table 1), generally envisaged the creation of a holding 
company through an equity issue subscribed by managers and employees. 
The holding acquires the state-owned enterprise being privatized. 
Management/employee buy-outs represent a main alternative to liquidation, 
offer advantages in terms of productivity incentives, but are most often seen 
as ways of minimizing lay-offs and restructuring. In order to be successful, 
the process requires a competent and skilled management and a stable work 
force.
A unique form of management buy-out that has been observed in 
Central and Eastern Europe is spontaneous privatization. An active role by 
state organizations can be envisaged (as in Hungary), or the process can be 
initiated and carried out by enterprises themselves. The common way in 
which spontaneous privatization takes place is by way of founding new 
companies (by turning part of the property into joint stock of limited 
liability companies) making use of state assets. Alternatively the creation of 
new firms can be encouraged. The first phase of the transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe has witnessed widespread phenomena of uncontrolled 
and 'spontaneous' privatization (See Johnson and Kroll, 1991). Spontaneous
21 This solution, however, presents problems of moral hazard. There is an 
incentive to bid with borrowed funds which, in the event of a successful bid, is 
relumed. Otherwise the bidder can disappear without personal costs of any kind.
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privatization was made possible by the existing legal framework governing 
state-owned enterprises, under which ownership rights were in the hands of 
the enterprises themselves. Managers (and to a lesser extent workers) have 
been able to use the legislative vacuum for stripping the enterprise’s assets. 
According to Johnson and Kroll, however, the acquisition of property rights 
de facto by the managers did not correspond, at least in this first phase, to 
an appropriation de jure. They maintain that only residual property rights 
were acquired, those that in the past granted direct and arbitrary 
interventions of the state or the ruling party in the day-to-day running of the 
enterprises. Transfers of this kind have for the most part survived the 
following institutional changes.
Instead of being sold, state assets can be leased, i.e. the right can be 
granted to use a specified good for a fixed period o f time with the obligation 
to pay a fee to the owner. This method does not involve divesture of state 
assets or transfer of ownership and can also be thought of as a temporary 
measure before privatization.
Finally, with respect to the recent experience of economies in transition, 
alternative privatization proposals based on distribution schemes have been 
devised, often referred to as give-away, or vouchers or mass privatization 
schemes. These schemes can be usefully regrouped into three main 
categories:
a. those envisaging the distribution of assets directly to the population at 
large;
b. those foreseeing the creation of financial intermediaries (investment, 
mutual or privatization funds) and the distribution of their shares to 
the population;
c. those conceiving the establishment of holdings to manage a group of 
state-owned enterprises.
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Mass privatization is based on the free distribution (or at a nominal fee) 
of vouchers or certificates which each citizen receives and which give 
entitlement to some equity share. It is normally a fraction of state capital 
which is distributed. Some enterprises remain under state control and are 
privatized according to one or more o f the standard methods discussed 
above.
These kinds of schemes present a number of positive features.22 First, 
they can be implemented relatively quickly and therefore allow a rapid 
eradication o f state property. The non-discretionary nature of the process 
presents advantages in terms of transparency of the procedures and 
avoidance of corruption. At the end of the process, the distribution of 
wealth accumulated under the previous regime may turn out to be more 
'equitable', therefore helping to gain public support for the entire 
privatization (and reform) process. Schemes of this kind can be 
implemented even if there are not enough resources in the hands o f the 
population necessary to buy goods being privatized, a case relevant for 
transitional economies. Vouchers or certificates can have a pre-determined 
monetary value and may or may not be tradable between individuals. They 
could be used to bid for shares in auctions for a particular group of 
enterprises or sectors, thus also avoiding the intricate problem of evaluation 
of stocks, the value of which is left to be determined on the market. 
However, the public at large is unlikely to be willing (or even able) to bid. 
Financial intermediaries can be created, which manage large amounts of 
vouchers and behave as institutional investors. A large variety of schemes is 
characterizing the experience of post-communist economies.
22 For a review of costs and benefits of mass privatization schemes, see Nuti, 
1994.
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4. Privatization Strategies in Post-Communist Economies23
Private property was present also in centrally planned economies, mostly in 
the form of private savings or bequests, ownership of small shops or 
dwellings. In some countries, private activity made up a significant part of 
the economic activity (for instance in the case of Polish agriculture). This 
can explain the fact that at least ex ante privatization schemes varied 
markedly among countries and privatization proposals have been 
appreciated to a different extent by the population. There are, however, a 
number of common institutional features which characterize the experience 
of economies in transition.
All economies, with the exception of Latvia, established a central 
privatization institution charged with the supervision of the privatization 
process. More recently, an increasing number of countries has also created 
trust funds or agencies for the management of the assets not yet divested. All 
enterprises of a large dimension underwent a process of 'corporatization', 
i.e., they were transformed into joint-stock or limited liabilities companies 
before being privatized. Some degree of financial restructuring has been 
performed, especially for clearing part of the inter-enterprise arrears 
developed since the inception of the transition. To a lesser extent, some 
reduction in the dimension of the enterprises has also taken place, especially 
breaking up actual or potential monopolies. However, in almost all cases, 
operational restructuring has been left with the new owners. Small-scale 
privatization has been a rather smooth and relatively rapid process. 
Regardless of substantial differences in the initial definition of privatization
23 The aim of this section is only that of recalling the main features o f  the 
privatization paths followed by economics in transition. Several articles and books 
have been published recently describing these processes in detail. An excellent 
survey on a country by country basis can be found, for instance, in Earle, Frydman 
and Rapaczynski (1993) and Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle et al. (1993a and 1993b).
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strategies, economies in transition ended up using all privatization 
techniques, albeit to a different degree.
The use of standard privatization techniques - public or private offering 
• has for the most part been constrained by some of the institutional features 
of centrally planned economies. Borensztein and Kumar (1991, pp. 304- 
305) indicate that distorted prices, trade and management arrangements 
under the previous regime made it virtually impossible to arrive at proper 
estimates of the firm's market value and its profitability potential. Also, 
private savings in Central and Eastern European countries were generally 
limited, or in any case not significant enough to buy the very large amount 
of assets being alienated. Moreover, in many countries, price liberalization 
has been accompanied by a strong increase in price inflation, which has 
substantially reduced these savings. Nevertheless public and private 
offerings have been utilized to a limited extent in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic.24 Sales of enterprises, as opposed 
to free distribution of assets, have been given priority in Hungary, where 
considerable foreign participation has also been encouraged, in contrast to 
other countries, especially the Czech Republic and Poland. Finally, a unique 
form of privatization through sale of property has taken place in Poland, the 
so-called 'privatization by liquidation'25 whereby state-owned enterprise is 
disbanded and its assets are sold (or contributed) to a new private company 
in most cases formed by employees of the firm itself.
The most innovative feature of privatization in post-communist 
economies is certainly the adoption of mass privatization schemes. With the 
exception of the former GDR, all Central and Eastern European countries 
have adopted some forms of mass privatization. There are a number of 
features which should be singled out
24 Given the completely different nature of the transition, in the former GOR usual 
forms o f privatization have been used more extensively.
25 See Szomburg (1993), pp. 82-84 and Sadowsld (1991), pp. 52-53.
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Despite the fact that voucher schemes are the flagship of privatization in 
all transitional economies, the enterprises privatized in this way form a 
minority. Even in the countries where these schemes have found wider 
application, i.e., the Czech Republic and Lithuania, only a small proportion 
(36% and 20% respectively) of state-owned enterprise are being privatized 
by means of voucher distribution.26 Some of the remaining enterprises will 
remain state-owned, others are being privatized according to standard 
methods.
A number of investment funds have been established in all countries to 
serve as intermediaries in the privatization process. However, while in some 
countries (Russia, the Czech and Slovak Republics) the choice of whether to 
bid directly for shares or to do it through an intermediary was left with the 
citizens, other countries (e.g. Poland and Romania) opted for closed-end 
investment funds or holdings created by the government.
Where investment funds have started to operate (e.g. the Czech 
Republic, Russia, Lithuania) privatization has gained speed and popular 
participation has increased. Part of the success has been explained in terms 
of the funds' advertising campaigns, which are raising expectations of 
substantial returns on investments. Despite the danger linked to the 
possibility of a widespread cashing-in of the promised gains (very often 
short-term) and the consequent fear of collapse of the fragile financial 
system the process so far has developed rather smoothly and episodes of 
mismanagement seem to be more the exception than the rule. The 
investment funds are also emerging as the main shareholders of privatized 
companies.
In most cases, secondary trading of vouchers is not allowed and they can 
be transferred only under particular conditions, mostly among members of
26 In the Slovak Republic, the proportion is higher (65%), but apparently 
enterprises contributed only a fracuon of their shares for vouchers. See CCEET 
(1993), p.17.
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the same family. Vice versa, in the case of Russia, vouchers issued with 
R.1,000 nominal face value were made tradable immediately on issue. 
Vouchers' re-tradability and the decentralized procedures in auctioning the 
enterprises are singled out as the main reasons for accelerating privatization 
in Russia (see Lissovolik (1993), pp. 11-12).
Finally, schemes also differ in terms of foreign participation. While in 
the Czech and Slovak Republics, foreigners cannot participate in the 
auctions, in Russia their participation is allowed, although with some 
limitations.
5. A Preliminary Assessment
On the whole, the evaluation of alternative strategies of privatization 
adopted by the various Central and Eastern European countries is made 
difficult by the fact that privatization is a relatively new phenomenon in 
economies in transition. The fact that post-communist economies are ending 
up using all conceivable privatization techniques, makes it difficult to assess 
which strategy presents the best performance. Moreover, a complete 
evaluation o f aims and results of privatization will only be possible in a few 
years' time, when the process will come to an end and more statistical 
evidence will be made available. Nevertheless, it might be useful to single 
out some elements for a preliminary assessment. According to Dhanji and 
Milanovic (1991), alternative strategies should be compared taking into 
account their performance with respect to:
a. equity;
b. speed of the privatization process;
c. ability to control and supervise managers' behaviour;
d. capacity to generate budget revenue.
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The adoption of mass privatization schemes certainly goes in the 
direction of a more equitable distribution of the national wealth accumulated 
under the previous regime. Some countries have imposed important 
limitations, based on citizenship, or years of permanence in a specific job, 
which are running against a principle of equity. In other cases (i.e. Russia) 
the employees seem to be able to benefit more than outsiders from the 
privatization of their enterprises. These concessions can be easily explained 
in political terms (see the consideration developed in section 2.1), but 
probably violate the rationale of an equitable distribution of wealth.
It is by now clear that in transitional economies, privatization is a much 
slower process than anticipated. The ambitious targets (number of economic 
units to be privatized in a given time span) set at the outset of the 
privatization processes have nowhere been realized. Table 2 summarizes 
targets and preliminary results of both small and large-scale privatization 
under way in economies in transition and recalls some of the central 
institutions involved in the process.
With respect to large-scale privatization, by mid-1993 the best 
performing countries (the Czech and Slovak Republics) were able to 
transfer into private hands over 80% of the total number of enterprises to 
be privatized. However, all other Central and Eastern European countries 
were lagging very far behind and in some cases - in Albania, Latvia, 
Romania, as well as in many former Soviet republics - large-scale 
privatization has just started.
Even in the case of small-scale privatization, which, however, has been a 
rather successful process in all countries, deadlines have been postponed, or, 
as documented in Table 2, the process remains to be completed.
At the same time, the transfer of state assets to the private sector has 
been paralleled by a rapid growth of a new private sector which has greatly 



















































The dispersion o f ownership resulting from the adoption of mass 
privatization schemes could represent an impediment to efficient control and 
supervision of managers' behaviour, especially in an environment 
characterized by a rudimentary structure o f corporate governance. The 
adoption of the different models of managerial supervision discussed in 
section 2.2 may lead to different results in different countries, although it 
seems too early to identify whether it has been possible to derive an increase 
in efficiency actually from the transfer of property rights. Moreover, given 
the thorough nature of the changes under way, it will be impossible even in 
the future to trace back which part of the increase could be ascribed to the 
change in ownership and which to other systemic transformations carried 
out during the transition to a market economy.
As discussed above, the possibility of using privatization revenues to 
improve the state of public finance remains a rather controversial issue even 
for market economy. Economies in transition do not seem particularly 
concerned with the need to use privatization proceeds for improving their 
fiscal stance at least in the short term. So far the process of privatization has 
represented a net loss for the state budget and as the transition has entailed 
enormous social and economic costs, one could wonder whether revenue 
from privatization could not have been used to reduce growing state budget 
deficit, public debts, or at least their foreign component.
7. Conclusions
The paper has argued that the expansion of the activity of the private sector 
in post-communist economies has been perceived almost exclusively as the 
privatization of vast sectors of the economy in the shortest possible time. 
Privatization is certainly crucial in consolidating the passage of a state-
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controlled economy to a profit-oriented market system. The attention paid 
to the transfer of ownership rights is also one of the main differences with 
respect to past reform experience, when the issue o f property rights was 
explicitly excluded because of ideological reasons and repeated attempts 
were made to improve the performance of the system without questioning 
state ownership of the means of production. Indeed, today the failure o f 
previous reforms is often attributed to the lack o f property-rights 
transformation.
However, even (and arguably to a greater extent) in formerly planned 
economies, the increase in economic efficiency generally attributed to 
privatization very much depends on the competitiveness and the degree o f 
regulation that characterizes a given economic system. Privatization must be 
paralleled by the introduction of measures which regulate market power and 
institutions must be created for an effective control of the privatization 
process.
The paper has also briefly reviewed the main issues of the privatization 
processes in Central and Eastern Europe to conclude that privatization is 
progressing at different speeds in different countries. The widespread use o f 
give-away schemes, easily justifiable in political terms, has entailed costs for 
the budget, while, at the same time, governments in transitional economies 
have deprived themselves of a possible source of revenue, often in the 
presence of growing budget deficits largely deriving from the need to tackle 
the economic and social costs of the transition. A careful scrutiny of the 
costs and benefits of privatization, however, would only be possible with the 
availability of a more comprehensive set of data.
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